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by the courts of Oklahoma, it establishes an exception to the rule of
Brewer.
In summary, Brewer creates a serious obstacle to any attempt to
win compensation for consequential damages when the fact situation
is strictly analogous, but in a significant number of cases the authority
of the earlier cases will preclude the government from interposing the
police power argument. In those latter cases, Oklahoma continues to
follow the majority of jurisdictions which hold that a material impair-
ment of access is a compensable injury to property.2 3
Jerry M. Snider
HOME MORTGAGE "ESCROW ACCOUNTS"--NEw YORK LAW
REQUIRING MORTGAGE LENDING INSTITUTIONS TO PAY INTEREST
UPON ESCROW ACCOUNTS DECLARED CONSTITUTIONAL. Jamaica
Savings Bank v. Lefkowitz, 390 F. Supp. 1357 (E.D. N.Y. 1975).
In recent years public criticism has increasingly focused upon the
profits derived by mortgage lending institutions from their beneficial use
of funds prepaid by residential mortgagors into "escrow accounts."' As
a result, by the end of 1974, Connecticut,2 Massachusetts,3 New Hamp-
23. See generally Note, 5 ST. MAlaY's U. 400 (1973).
1. In addition to monthly principal and interest payments, mortgage lending
institutions commonly require residential mortgagors to prepay amounts in monthly
installments sufficient when accumulated to satisfy taxes, assessments and hazard insur-
ance premiums accruing to the mortgaged property. These monthly installments are
credited to what are generally termed "escrow accounts." Institutional mortgagees
customarily pay no interest upon the escrow account monies and are free to use and
comingle these funds to their benefit so long as tax and insurance obligations of the
properties are met. See generally Note, Lender Accountability arid the Problem of
Noninterest-Bearing Mortgage Escrow Accounts, 54 Bos. U.L. REv. 516 (1974); Note,
Trusts: Requiring Mortgage Loan Escrow Holders to Account for Profits Earned on Tax
and Insurance Prepayments, 28 OKLA. L. R1v. 213 (1975); Note, The Attack upon the
Tax and Insurance Escrow Accounts in Mortgages, 47 TEMP. L.Q. 352 (1974).
The practice of requiring escrow accounts arose during the depression years of the
1930's, in order to assure protection of the mortgagees' interests against superior tax liens
and against loss due to destruction of the property. Escrow accounts are now required in
comection with all FHA insured and VA loans and certain home mortgage loans made
by federally chartered institutions. 24 C.F.R. § 203.23 (1974); 38 C.F.R. § 36.4512
(1974); 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-1(a) (4) (iii) (1975).
2. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 49-2 (Supp. 1975).
3. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 183, § 61 (Supp. 1975).
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shire,4 and New York' had enacted laws requiring lending institutions to
pay interest to the mortgagors upon funds held in escrow accounts.
Oklahoma and other states0 are contemplating some type of escrow
account legislation. Oklahoma's proposed law7 is virtually identical to
that portion of the New York statutes which was recently upheld as
constitutional by a three-judge panel of the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York in Jamaica Savings Bank v.
Lefkowitz.9 Thus, Jamaica holds special interest for legislators in Okla-
homa and other states where the proposed legislation is based upon the
New York law.
Briefly, the challenged statute provides that mortgage lending insti-
tutions shall pay not less than two percent interest annually upon
amounts maintained in escrow accounts established in connection with
loans secured by mortgages on any one to six family dwellings occupied
by the owner and located within New York. The imposition of service
charges for maintaining escrow accounts is prohibited unless imposed
pursuant to an express contract provision entered into prior to the law's
effective date.' The state's banking board is empowered to set a mini-
mum rate of interest above the two percent floor and to establish a
formula for computing the interest to be paid. Institutions are exempt
from payment of interest in only three instances: where a con-
tract entered into prior to the effective date of the law expressly
provides for nonpayment of interest; where payment of interest would
violate a federal law or regulation; or where escrow accounts are main-
tained by a mortgage servicing company, unaffiliated with the mortgage
lending institution, pursuant to a prior written contract which does not
permit the lending institution to use or receive a return upon the escrow
funds."'
Plaintiff (the bank) in Jamaica launched a comprehensive consti-
tutional attack against the statute,' 2 asking declaratory and injunctive
4. N.H. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 384:16-c (Supp. 1973).
5. N.Y. BANKiNG LAw § 14-b (McKinney Supp. 1974); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-
601 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
6. Note, Trusts: Requiring Mortgage Loan Escrow Holders to Account for Profits
Earned on Tax and Insurance Prepayments, 28 OKIA. L. REv. 213, 215 (1975).
7. Okla. H.B. 1526, Okla. S.B. 133, 35th Legis., 1st Sess. (1975).
8. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 14-b (McKinney Supp. 1974).
9. 390 F. Supp. 1357 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
10. N.Y. GEN. OjLm. LAw § 5-601 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
11. N.Y. BAN~wG LAw § 14-b (McKinney Supp. 1974).
12. Although the interest requirement is contained in N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-
601 (McKinney Supp. 1974), as well as N.Y. BANEIG LAW § 14-b (McKinney Supp.
1974), the plaintiff's attack was aimed only at the latter statute.
1975]
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relief from enforcement based upon the statute's alleged violation of
both the contract clause of article I, section 10 of the United States
Constitution,13 and the due process and equal protection clauses of the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. 14
Arguing that contracts entered into prior to the effective date of the
law were impaired by the statute contrary to the contract clause, the
bank contended nonpayment of interest on escrow accounts, though not
an express provision of prior contracts, was a term implied in fact. The
implication was claimed to have arisen by reason of the stipulated fact
that the mortgagors' attorneys knew that interest would not be paid
upon escrow funds and acquiesced in the arrangement. In addition, the
bank argued that it would not have entered into the loan contracts had
payment of interest upon escrow accounts been required.
In rejecting the bank's argument, Judge Costantino stated that
mere absence of a contract provision does not raise the implication of a
term implied in fact. 5 Relying on the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in El Paso v. Simmons,16 the court held that as profits
derived from the bank's use of escrow funds were not specifically
allocated by the contracts, the legislature, by virtue of its police power,
possessed the authority to provide for allocation of those profits in order
to "safeguard the vital interests of its people.' 7
The court reached the central issue of the case in discussing the
problem of adhesion and unconscionability inherent in such contracts.
It is uncontroverted that motgagors could not have obtained
mortgages if they had insisted upon a term in the contracts
providing interest. These mortgage agreements-almost all
identical-were drafted by the plaintiff and essentially offered
to potential mortgagors on a take it or leave it basis. The
state legislature properly exercised its power to correct an
imbalance in the bargaining relationship.'
The plaintiff's claim that the payment of interest under the statute
constituted a taking without due process of law in violation of the
fourteenth amendment was held to be "not substantial."'1 The mortga-
gors did not intend the mortgagee to have a beneficial interest in the
13. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
14. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
15. 390 F. Supp. at 1361.
16. 379 U.S. 497 (1965).
17. 390 F. Supp. at 1362.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1363.
[Vol. I11
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escrow funds but rather intended that the mortgagee should hold the
money as agent for payment to third parties; therefore, the mortgagee
held "no ultimate beneficial interest"20 in the funds to which a taking
could apply. Consequently, no violation of due process occured.
Finally, the bank alleged infringement of the fourteenth amend-
ment's equal protection clause, arguing that it was irrational to attempt
to distinguish between contracts which expressly excluded payment of
interest and those which were silent as to payment. However, the deci-
sion recognized that the statutory distinction between contracts contain-
ing expressly bargained-for terms and those in which specific assent and
fairness were absent was entirely rational and not arbitrary.
The statute challenged in Jamaica appears to be the most restrictive
of those enacted thus far.2' It affords the parties little ground upon
which to formulate individual solutions to the escrow funds problem. In
fact, probably the only alternative available under such a statute is one
in which institutional mortgagees might elect, where permitted,22 to
forego the requirement of escrow accounts altogether. 23 Yet, the profits
derived from the free use of escrow account monies have long been
relied upon by mortgage lending institutions as a source of income. With
20. Id. The court did conjecture that had the bank shown profits realized from
escrow accounts to be insufficient so that the bank had had to utilize its own general
funds to make the interest payments, there might have been a taking. Instead the bank
offered proof only that it was currently losing money on its mortgage loans as a whole.
21. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 49-2 (Supp. 1975) provides that interest shall be paid
by mortgage lending institutions at a rate of not less than two percent per annum, which
interest shall be credited toward payment of taxes and insurance premiums. The statute
imposes a maximum fine of $100 per violation.
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 183 § 61 (Supp. 1975) requires payment of interest
solely upon the amount prepaid monthly to satisfy tax obligations, and "at a rate and in
a manner to be determined by the mortgagee." (Emphasis added.) Institutional mortga-
gees must file annual statements of net profit or loss from investment of that portion of
escrow accounts attributable to tax obligations. The state bank commissioner may, upon
request, grant an exemption from payment of interest to mortgagees showing net losses.
N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 384:16-c (Supp. 1975) provides that banks must credit
each escrow account with interest "at a rate not less than two percent below the rate paid
on regular savings deposits in said bank."
22. As previously noted, escrow accounts are required on all FHA insured and VA
loans and certain loans made by federally chartered institutions. 24 C.F.R. § 203.23
(1974); 38 C.F.R. § 36.4512 (1974); 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-1(a)(4)(iii) (1975). See note 1
supra.
23. In such an event, additional factors must be considered. For example, some
borrowers view the maintenance of escrow accounts as a service provided by the lending
institutions whereby the individual borrower is relieved of the burden of making large
annual or semi-annual payments directly to the taxing authority and insurer. More
importantly, in order to protect their interests, institutions would find it necessary to
conduct periodic inquiries of taxing authorities and insurers to ascertain whether the
obligations had been met. The expense involved in this inquiry process would ultimately
be thrown upon the borrower in one form or another.
1975]
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the elimination of or reduction in this income, institutions will be forced
to look elsewhere for additional income to offset general operating ex-
penses. Undoubtedly, the result will be reflected in higher costs to the
borrower, either in the form of higher interest rates on loans or by the
imposition of service charges. 4
As previously stated, numerous states are considering enactment of
escrow account legislation."; The delicate dilemma facing those legisla-
tures is one of balancing of interests. It is generally conceded that lending
institutions should be allowed some method of safeguarding their inter-
est in the mortgaged property, however, individual mortgagors must not
be divested of their property prematurely and without just compensa-
tion.2
In order to avoid the restrictive effect of a statute such as New
York's, an arrangement fairer to both mortgagor and mortgagee should
be considered. For example, the mortgagee and mortgagor could spe-
cifically agree, as an alternative to the establishment of the usual es-
crow account, that an amount necessary to satisfy tax and insurance ob-
ligations be paid by the mortgagor directly to the mortgagee at the time
the obligation actually accrues in favor of the third parties (normally on
an annual or semi-annual basis). The mortgagor under such a plan
retains the use of his money until the debt is in fact owed, while the
mortgagee retains a method to monitor payment and assure protection
of its investment in the property. 7 In addition, the mortgagee's expense
attributable to maintaining such an annual or semi-annual escrow ac-
count would certainly amount to no more than the maintenance ex-
24. Under the New York statute, service charges imposed specifically for the
maintenance of escrow accounts are forbidden, unless imposed pursuant to an express
contractual provision entered into prior to the law's effective date. N.Y. GEN. OnLIo.
LAW § 5-601 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
25. Okla. H.B. 1526, Okla. S.B. 133, 35th Legis., 1st Sess. (1975); Note, Trusts:
Requiring Mortgage Loan Escrow Holders to Account for Profits Earned on Tax and
Insurance Prepayments, 28 OKLA. L. Rlv. 213, 215 (1975). See text accompanying note
6 supra.
26. State action is presently essential for protection of mortgagors' interests in light
of a proposed amendment to Federal Home Loan Bank Board regulations. The proposed
amendment to 12 C.F.R. 545.6-11 (1975) would apply to home mortgage loans within
the Board's jurisdiction. The payment of interest upon escrow funds would be condi-
tioned in part upon the existence, in the state in which the dwelling is located, of a
specific statutory provision mandating payment of interest. 40 Fed. Reg. 4661 (1975).
27. If instead, a traditional escrow arrangement were preferred or required, then
payment of interest could be imposed according to an appropriate statutory scheme. In
any event, full disclosure of the escrow account requirement by the mortgagee to the
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